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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawmaking by initiative differs significantly from America's tradi-
tional form of representative government.' Initiatives are best de-
scribed as procedures instituted and controlled by voters to make new
laws by amending the constitution or, alternatively, by enacting sta-
tutes. 2 The use of initiatives to amend constitutions or enact statutes
frequently is termed "direct democracy" as opposed to "representa-
tive democracy." 3 Initiatives generally allow the public to bypass the
legislature and reserve direct lawmaking power in the voters of the
state. Citizens propose constitutional amendments by initiative, and
the general electorate adopts or rejects the proposed amendment at
the polls.
Florida adopted a constitutional initiative procedure in 1968. 4 Since
then, citizens increasingly have used the procedure to propose amend-
ments to the Florida Constitution. For the 1994 general election,
1. Gilbert Hahn & Steven C. Morton, Note, Initiative and Referendum-Do They Encour-
age or Impair Better State Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 925, 927 (1977).
2. Id. at 925.
3. FLA. S. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM & OVERSIGHT, A REVIEW OF THE CITIZEN INITIATIVE
METHOD OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION 9 (1995) (on file with
comm.) [hereinafter CITIZEN INrrIATIVE].
4. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; see TALBOT D'ALEmRTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITU-
TION-A REFERENCE GUIDE 13 (1991).
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twenty-six constitutional initiative committees filed with the
Department of State expressing their intent to collect signatures for
initiative petitions.' While only three initiatives made ballot position
during that election, the number of committees formed demonstrates
the potential for numerous future revisions and amendments to the
constitution. 6 In fact, several committees are pursuing their failed ini-
tiatives for the 1996 election. 7
There are many concerns about Florida's constitutional initiative
process.' A primary issue is the extent to which the constitution
should be used to affect and institute policy.' In a 1993 Florida Su-
preme Court decision, Justice Parker Lee McDonald stated:
The legal principles in the state constitution inherently command a
higher status than any other legal rules in our society. By
transcending time and changing political mores, the constitution is a
document that provides stability in the law and society's consensus
on general, fundamental values. Statutory law, on the other hand,
provides a set of legal rules that are specific, easily amended, and
adaptable to the political, economic, and social changes of our
society. 10
However, constitutional amendments by initiative are the only way
for Florida citizens to affect law other than through the legislative
process. Most states that provide citizens an opportunity to amend
their constitutions by initiative also have a procedure to amend sta-
tutes by initiative.
This Article examines Florida's constitutional initiative process and
describes the constitutional and statutory initiative processes in other
states. It then discusses issues about Florida's current constitutional
initiative process and addresses several bills introduced during the
1995 Regular Session to revise the current process. The Article con-
cludes that Florida should develop and adopt an indirect statutory ini-
tiative procedure. It further concludes that in tandem with instituting
a statutory process, Florida should revise the current constitutional
initiative process to make it more difficult to amend the constitution.
5. CI=mz INrrSATIvE, supra note 3. at 1.
6. See id.
7. Interview with Division of Elections, Fla. Dept. of State (Nov. 16, 1995) (notes on file
with Fla. S. Comm. on Gov't Reform & Oversight, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter Division of
Elections Interview].
8. See infra part VII.
9. See id.
10. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997, 1000
(Fla. 1993) (McDonald, J., concurring).
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The revisions could include increasing the number of signatures re-
quired to place an initiative on the ballot, restricting subject areas, or
requiring a super-majority vote for approval. With these legislative ac-
tions, Floridians would continue to have a direct voice in their govern-
ment and also preserve the sanctity of the state's constitution.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The original thirteen colonies framed their constitutions just before,
or soon after, the Declaration of Independence in 1776." Some states
molded their colonial charters into constitutions. 2 These early consti-
tutions reflected a basic distrust of government and therefore included
various provisions to restrain possible governmental abuses. 3 The
constitutions included basic principles of political democracy, such as
popular sovereignty, separation of powers, a system of checks and
balances, a bill of rights, and a predominant legislature. 4 Early con-
stitutions also established tripartite governments modeled on the fed-
eral structure."5 The constitutions "set forth powers and procedures of
the three governmental branches in varying detail, defined state
boundaries, described the relationship of the state to the federal gov-
ernment, specified suffrage qualifications and the method of conduct-
ing elections, and provided for constitutional amendment and
revision."' 6
The original state constitutions were short, containing predomi-
nantly fundamental matters. 7 Many factors contributed to the
increased length and complexity of state constitutions, including the
adoption of initiative and referendum procedures in some states,
urban growth and urbanization, technological developments, and the
resulting growth in the magnitude and complexity of state functions
and responsibilities.'
In the twentieth century, states have relied mainly on formal
amendment, revision, and rewriting to develop their constitutions. '9
This method has produced lengthy documents featuring massive
11. ALBERT L. STuRm, TsnRTy YEARS OF STATE CosTiTUTom-MAKiNG: 1938-1968 4 (1970).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 4-5.
15. Id.
16. Id. at5.
17. Id. Sturm points out, "In theory, constitutional provisions are presumed to include
only organic features of permanent character and sufficient significance to warrant placement in
the basic law." Id. at 6.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id.
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detail. 20 This detail is attributable in part to a continued public distrust
of legislatures-a distrust resulting from past abuses and excesses by
these bodies during the nineteenth century. 2' In addition, public dis-
satisfaction with strict judicial interpretations of constitutional provi-
sions, the pressure of special interests for constitutional status, and
poor drafting have contributed to the increased length of state consti-
tutions.22 Likewise, lengthy constitutions historically require more
amendatory detail.2 3
There are four basic avenues for proposing formal alterations to
state constitutions: legislative action, popular initiative, constitutional
convention, and constitutional commission34 The Florida Constitu-
tion permits all four methods and further allows the Taxation and
Budget Reform Commission to propose amendments. 21
III. ORIGIN OF INIIATIVES
In the United States, the initiative, referendum, and recall move-
ment emerged from the populist and progressive eras of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.26 At that time, citizens perceived
state governments to be controlled by "special interests, such as rail-
roads, bankers, land speculators, and 'robber barons'." 27 Conse-
quently, processes were devised to allow citizens an avenue to approve
or disapprove government actions by direct vote.28
Direct democracy through initiatives differs significantly from rep-
resentative democracy. 29 America's form of representative democracy
was developed to balance minority and civil rights against the dangers
of popular rule.3 0 James Madison proposed that representative gov-
ernment would
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5-6.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 18.
25. See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
26. Tommy Neal, The Voter Initiative, 1 NAT'L CONy. STATE LEGISLATURES LEGisBREF 38,
Oct. 1993, at 1.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Hahn & Morton, supra note 1, at 925.
30. ALFRED BALITZER, THE hNrrLATivE AND REFERENDUM: A STUDY AND EVALUATION OF
DIRECT LEGISLATION, THE CAnoIONA ROUNDTABLE 13 (1981). The Founding Fathers recognized
that direct democracy posed a profound threat to individual rights and liberty. Id. The Constitu-
tion was "designed to provide a system of government that would prevent either a tyranny of the
majority or a tyranny of the few." Id. James Madison "warned against the power of a majority
or a minority of the population 'united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the
community'." Id.
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refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens,' whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and
love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations.3
Initiatives, by contrast, reserve direct lawmaking power to the
voters through providing them a method to make new laws by amend-
ing the constitution or, alternatively, by enacting statutes.3 2 A criti-
cism of using initiatives to make policy is that this method undermines
our basic representative form of government." Moreover, contrary to
the original intent of initiatives, there is concern that initiatives be-
come the tool of special interests that can finance the placement of an
initiative on the ballot.34 Efforts of the represented to control their
representatives through initiatives have been described as curing the
problems of democracy with more democracy. 5
Although many historical phenomena contributed to the develop-
ment of mechanisms for direct legislation, the initiative process can be
traced directly to Switzerland.36 Between 1831 and 1890, the Swiss
adopted forms of the initiative and referendum for both ordinary leg-
islative measures and constitutional proposals.317 The Swiss experience
spawned advocates in the United States."
In 1898, South Dakota became the first state to establish constitu-
tional and statutory initiative processes for direct legislation. 9 By
1918, nineteen states had adopted an initiative process; most of these
states were west of the Mississippi. 40 By 1992, twenty-four states had
authorized constitutional or statutory initiative processes.4 1
IV. HISTORY OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION AND METHODS OF
AmENDMENT
4 2
The Florida Constitution has been readopted five times and
amended many times since its origin. In 1837, the Florida territory
31. FLA. ADvis. COUNCIL ON INTEROOVTL. REL., INrATrvES AND REFERENDA: ISSUES IN CIT-
IZEN LAWMAKING i (1986) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter INrrIATivES & REFERENDA].
32. Hahn & Morton, supra note 1, at 926-27.
33. Id.
34. Neal, supra note 26, at 2.
35. INrTrATIVEs & REFERENDA, supra note 31, at ii.
36. DAvrD B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGiSLAT N-VoTrN ON BALLOT PROPOSITONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 31 (1984).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 38-39.
40. Neal, supra note 26, at 1.
41. Id.
42. This brief history is based on Talbot D'Alemberte's Reference Guide; see
CITIZEN INITIATIVE IN FLORIDA
elected to seek statehood. 4 In 1838, the United States Congress set up
a two-house Legislature with a twenty-six member House of Represen-
tatives and an eleven-member Senate to govern the Florida Territory.4
Florida held its first constitutional convention in 1838; in 1839, the
voters adopted the proposed constitution by a narrow vote of 2,065 to
1,961.45
The constitution of 1838 was Florida's basic charter when the state
entered the Union in 1845. 46 That document was not displaced until
Florida joined the Confederacy in 1861. 47 The 1861 constitution was
basically the same as the 1838 constitution with the exception of a
recognition of the Confederacy as the national government s. 4  At the
end of the Civil War in 1865, Florida needed a new constitution.
49
Florida adopted the 1865 constitution prior to full implementation
of Reconstruction. 0 In 1867, Congress returned most of the South to
military rule and took other steps to transform the governments of the
former Confederate states."1 The 1868 constitution accompanied the
second military occupation and provided the governor with authority
to appoint state cabinet and county officers.5 2 Many of the 1868 provi-
sions are still in the modern document.5 3 At the end of Reconstruction
in 1885, Florida adopted a new constitution. 4 An elected cabinet and
elected county officials displaced the governor's appointment power."
From 1885 to 1968, the constitution did not undergo further general
revision; however, there were numerous changes by amendment.
5 6
In 1964, Florida voters approved a proposal for the amendment of
the constitution that allowed revision without a constitutional
D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 4, at 3-15. D'Alemberte, former President of the American Bar Asso-
ciation and current President of Florida State University, was Chairman of the 1978 Constitu-
tion Revision Commission.
43. Id. (stating that citizens elected statehood by a vote of 2,139 to 1,164).
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 6-7.
53. ld. (reporting that the 1868 constitution provided for public schools, the homestead
exemption, and uniform taxes and displaced the language which limited the rights of freemen;
however, women were not enfranchised).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 9 (stating that during this 83-year period, 211 amendments were proposed and 147
were adopted).
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convention." 7 In 1965, a statutory Constitution Revision Commission
was appointed, and a major constitutional revision occurred in 1968.58
The 1968 revision substantially changed the executive and legislative
branches" and granted new constitutional privileges. 60 It also added
two new methods for amending the constitution: a constitution revi-
sion commission and the initiative procedure. 6'
In 1978, the independent Constitution Revision Commission met
for the first time in Florida. 62 However, voters defeated the proposals
of the commission, along with a proposal for casino gambling placed
on the ballot by initiative. 63 In 1988, the Legislature proposed, and the
voters approved, a constitutional amendment to create a Taxation and
Budget Reform Commission with jurisdiction limited to tax and
budget matters." The commission meets every tenth year and has the
power to propose amendments to the constitution.65
The Florida Constitution has more methods of amendment than
any other state constitution. 66 Article XI of the Florida Constitution
provides that the electorate may adopt revisions or amendments to the
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id. D'Alemberte notes that the 1968 revision shortened the size of the constitution from
20 articles to 12 and cut the text approximately in half. Id. at 12.
59. Id. The 1968 constitution made the first reference to a cabinet form of government,
established the Lieutenant Governor's office, adopted a provision for succession in the event of
the Governor's incapacity, and permitted the Governor to serve two terms. Id. This constitution
limited the size of the Senate to 40-50 members and the House of Representatives to 80-120
members. Id. at 12-13. It also provided for a legislative auditor, a civil service system, and a
code of ethics. Id. The new constitution also established a unique state court procedure for
prompt resolution of apportionment disputes. Id. at 13.
60. Id. This revision amended the Declaration of Rights to state that no one could be de-
prived of rights because of race or religion. Id. It removed provisions that sought to preserve
segregation in the schools and to prevent intermarriage between the races. Id. The revision added
protections against wiretapping and a provision giving public employees the right to organize.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 15. This was the first time in the United States that a constitution authorized such
a commission; other states provided for commissions by general law. Id.
63. Id. at 15; see also Stephen Maher, The Conference on the Florida Constitution, 68 FLA.
B. J. 66 (1994).
The 1978 Constitution Revision Commissiosr shaped much of the agenda for further amend-
ment of the constitution. D'AEaMtaRT, supra note 4, at 15. Subsequent proposed amendments,
substantially the same as those the commission developed, have included: 1) adding a right of
privacy to the Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1980; 2) extending impeachment to county
judges, adopted in 1988; 3) providing uniform rules for the judicial nominating commissions,
adopted in 1984; 4) extending the widows' exemption to widowers, adopted in 1988; 5) allowing
the Legislature to classify inventory for property tax purposes, adopted in 1980; and 6) providing
various changes in the state's authority relative to bonds, adopted in 1980 and 1984. Id.
64. Id. at 15.
65. Ft. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6.
66. D'AtEMERta, supra note 4, at 15.
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constitution in a general election.67 Amendments may be placed on the
ballot by any of the following methods: 1) adoption of a joint resolu-
tion by three-fifths of the membership of the House and Senate;6"
2) recommendation of the Constitution Revision Commission, which
meets every twentieth year since 1978;69 3) citizen initiative; 70
4) recommendation of a constitutional convention;71 and 5) recom-
mendation of the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, which
meets every tenth year since 1980.72 Since the major revision of the
constitution in 1968, ninety-seven proposed constitutional amend-
ments have made ballot position.73 Of these, voters adopted seventy-
three and rejected twenty-four. 74
V. AMENDMENT BY Imn TIvE IN FLORIDA
A. Provisions for Initiatives in the Constitution
The 1968 revisions to the Florida Constitution provided citizens
with the right to propose amendments to the constitution by initiative
petition. 75 The original amendment permitted initiative proposals to
change any section of the constitution. 76 However, a 1972 amendment
to article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution required proposals
to be limited to one subject matter. 77 In 1994, the electorate adopted
an initiative that exempted from the one-subject limitation any initia-
tive limiting the power of government to raise revenue. 7 Article XI,
section 3 currently provides:
ITihe power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or
portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people,
provided that any such revision or amendment, except for those
limiting the power of government to raise revenue, shall embrace but
one subject and matter directly connected therewith. It may be
invoked by filing with the secretary of state a petition containing a
copy of the proposed revision or amendment, signed by a number of
67. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
68. Id. art. XI, § 1.
69. Id. art. XI, § 2.
70. Id. art. XI, § 3.
71. Id. art. XI, § 4.
72. Id. art. XI, § 6.
73. Division of Elections Interview, supra note 7.
74. Id.
75. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; see INrrrArivEs & REFERENDA, supra note 3 1, at 15.
76. INrTATIVES & REFERENDA, supra note 31, at 15.
77. Id.
78. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1994 constitutional amendment number four relating to
revenue limits).
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electors in each of one half of the congressional districts of the state,
and of the state as a whole, equal to eight percent of the votes cast in
each of such districts, respectively and in the state as a whole in the
last preceding election in which presidential electors were chosen. 79
Other sections of the constitution also affect the initiative process.
Article XI, section 5 provides procedures for placing proposed amend-
ments on the ballot, including initiative proposals.8 0 After a proposed
amendment is filed with the secretary of state, it must be placed on
the ballot in the next election held more than ninety days after the
filing.8' The constitution requires that proposed amendments or revi-
sions be published twice prior to the election in one newspaper of gen-
eral circulation in each county.8 2 If the proposed amendment or
revision is approved by the voters, it becomes effective on the first
Monday after the first Tuesday in January following the election, or
on a date specified in the amendment.83
In 1986, the electorate voted for a constitutional amendment that
set forth certain responsibilities of the attorney general and the su-
preme court regarding the initiative process .84 The attorney general, as
directed by general law, must request the opinion of the justices of the
supreme court on the validity of initiative petitions.85 Also, the
amendment altered article V, section 3, which sets forth the jurisdic-
tion of the supreme court, to include the court's new responsibility."
B. Statutory Provisions for Placing a Constitutional
Initiative on the Ballot
Various Florida statutes set forth the process for filing initiative pe-
titions.87 The process can be time-consuming and expensive. A former
79. Id.
80. See id. art. XI, § 5.
81. Id. art. XI, § 5(a). However, the Legislature may move the proposal to an earlier elec-
tion by a three-fourths vote of each house. Id.
82. Id. art. XI, § 5(b).
83. Id. art. XI, § 5(c).
84. A joint legislative resolution placed the original proposal on the ballot. See Irr vavs
AND REFERENDA, supra note 31. The amended section states:
The attorney general shall, as directed by general law, request the opinion of the jus-
tices of the supreme court as to the validity of any initiative petition circulated pursu-
ant to Section 3 of Article XI. The justices shall, subject to their rules of procedure,
permit interested persons to be heard on the questions presented and shall render their
written opinion expeditiously.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
85. Id.
86. Id. art. V, § 3(10) (requiring the Florida Supreme Court to render an advisory opinion).
87. FLA. STAT. §§ 15.21, 16.061, 99.097, 100.371, 101.161, 106.03 (1995).
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secretary of state advises initiative committees to begin work at least
four years before an election in order to have sufficient time to gather
necessary signatures and deal with any legal challenges." However,
some committees have made ballot position in less time than two
years.89
The sponsor of an initiative amendment must register as a political
committee prior to obtaining any signatures.9 The sponsor of the peti-
tion prepares and the secretary of state approves the substance and
ballot title of a proposed amendment.9' When a constitutional amend-
ment gains ballot position, its substance must be written in "clear and
unambiguous language" and in such a manner that a "yes" vote will
indicate approval of the proposal and a "no" vote, rejection.9 2 The
Department of State assigns a designating number to each initiative
proposal and must furnish the number, ballot title, and substance of
each amendment to the supervisor of elections. 93
The Department of State approves only the form of the petition.94
The department staff checks the petition to determine whether the
ballot title is fifteen words or fewer, whether the summary is seventy-
five words or fewer,95 and for the correct size and format of the
petition.9 Once the initiative committee registers with the Department
and the Department approves the proposed amendment, the commit-
tee may begin circulating the petition to gather signatures.
Committees must gather enough signatures to equal eight percent of
the votes cast in each of one-half of the state's congressional districts
and in the state as a whole in the preceding presidential election.97 In
88. Jim Smith, So You Want To Amend the Florida Constitution? A Guide to Initiative
Petitions, 18 NOVA L. REv. 1509, 1511 (1994).
89. Id. at 1512.
90. FLA. STAT. § 106.03 (1995). This section requires that committees file a statement of
organization which must include: the name and address of the committee; the names, addresses,
and relationships of affiliated or connected organizations; the area, scope, or jurisdiction of the
committee; the name, address, and position of the custodian of books and accounts; the name,
address, and position of other principal officers; any issue or issues such organization is support-
ing or opposing; a statement as to whether the committee is a continuing one; a plan for the
disposition of residual funds in the event of dissolution of the committee; and a listing of all
banks, safe-deposit boxes, or other depositories used for committee funds. Id.
91. FLA. STAT. § 101.161(2) (1995); FLA. Aosmn. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.009(1) (1995).
92. FLA. STAT. § 101.161(1) (1995). The substance of the amendment must be an explana-
tory statement of the chief purpose of the proposal which does not exceed 75 words. Id. The
ballot title cannot exceed 15 words and commonly is used to refer to the measure. Id.
93. Id. § 101.161(2).
94. FLA. ADnam. CODE. ANN. r. 1S-2009(1) (1995) (providing for department review of the
petition's form only and not its legal sufficiency).
95. FLA. STAT. § 101.161 (1995).
96. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.009 (1995).
97. FLA. Co NsT. art. XI, § 3.
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1994, a committee had to gather 429,428 signatures to place a pro-
posal on the ballot. 98 The supervisor of elections verifies the petition
signatures. 99 The time this process takes depends on the number of
staff available for verification in each county; it frequently takes
several weeks. 100
The initiative committee must pay the supervisor of elections ten
cents for each signature checked or the actual cost of checking the
signature, whichever is less.' 0' However, if the committee is unable to
pay the charges without imposing an "undue burden" on its re-
sources, the signatures are verified at no charge. 2 The committee or
an opponent of the petition may contest the verification results.0 3
Upon certification of the necessary number and distribution of sig-
natures of registered voters, the supervisor of elections forwards the
respective certifications to the Division of Elections.'04 Initiatives ap-
pear on the ballot if they receive the requisite number of signatures at
least ninety-one days before the general election and are not rejected
by the court. 05
C. Judicial Review of Initiatives
When an initiative committee collects and obtains verification of at
least ten percent of the required signatures from one-quarter of the
congressional districts, the secretary of state submits the petition to
the attorney general. '06 The attorney general then requests the supreme
court's opinion about the petition's validity. 1°7 The court hears all
98. CrrIZN INrriATrE, supra note 3, at 22 (compiling information from telephone inter-
views with election officials).
99. FLA. STAT. § 100.371(4), (5) (1995). Section 99.097, Florida Statutes, sets forth the
process for verifying petition signatures. FLA. STAT. § 99.097 (1995). Section 99.097 is applicable
to verifying signatures for petitions submitted to qualify candidates for public office and initia-
tive petitions. Id. The supervisor of elections verifies signatures on either a name-by-name or
random-sample basis, as the Department of State provides. Id. In 1978, however, the supreme
court opined that the random sample verification was not applicable to initiative petitions. See
Let's Help Florida v. Smathers, 360 So. 2d 494, 496 (Fla. 1978). The court held that it is neces-
sary to verify each signature because the constitution mandates that at least eight percent of the
electors sign an initiative petition. Id.
100. Crrizasr INrriATrvE, supra note 3, at 22.
101. FLA. STAT. § 99.097(4) (1995).
102. Id. The comptroller reimburses, from the General Revenue Fund, the supervisor of
elections in each county for the ten cents or cost incurred in verifying signatures when a commit-
tee is unable to pay the charges because of an undue burden. Id.
103. Id. § 99.097(5).
104. Id. § 100.371(4).
105. Id. § 100.371(1).
106. Id. § 15.21(3).
107. FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 10; FLA. STAT. § 16.061 (1995). Section 16.061 states:
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questions presented by interested parties before rendering its opin-
ion. '0
The constitution specifies that a proposed amendment "shall em-
brace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith."°° The
Florida Supreme Court's first major interpretation of the single-sub-
ject requirement was in 1978.110 The court held that it would broadly
construe restrictions on the initiative process so as not to infringe on
the people's right to petition."' In 1984, in Fine v. Firestone,"' the
court receded from that ruling.
In Fine, the court determined that strict compliance with the single-
subject provision in article XI, section 3 is essential to the validity of
an initiative proposal." 3 The court discussed the difference between
initiative petitions for proposing amendments to the constitution and
other amendment alternatives which have inherent protections against
poor draftsmanship.11 4 Because initiatives are often poorly drafted,
the court held that close judicial scrutiny of initiative proposals will
protect the state constitution from ill-advised revision.", The court
strictly construed the single-subject provision of the constitution to
ensure that the electorate has notice of specific changes contemplated
by a proposed amendment. 1 6
The court has developed a three-point inquiry on the single-subject
issue. First, the court reviews the effect the amendment will have on
the constitution as a whole. 1 7 Second, it looks for violations of the
single-subject rule with respect to the effect of the amendment on
The Attorney General shall, within 30 days after receipt of a proposed revision or
amendment to the State Constitution by initiative petition from the Secretary of State,
petition the Supreme Court, requesting an advisory opinion regarding the compliance
of the text of the proposed amendment or revision with s. 3, Art. XI of the State
Constitution and the compliance of the proposed ballot title and substance with
s. 101.161. The petition may enumerate any specific factual issues which the Attorney
General believes would require a judicial determination.
FLA. STAT. § 16.061 (1995).
108. FtA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
109. Id. art. XI, § 3.
110. Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1978).
111. Id. at 340.
112. 448 So. 2d 984, 988 (Fla. 1984).
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also Cherie B. Albury, Comment, Amendment Nine and the Initiative Process:
A Costly Trip to Nowhere, 14 STETSON L. REv. 349, 358 (1985).
115. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988.
116. See id.; Albury, supra note 114, at 359.
117. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988; see also Albury, supra note 114, at 359. When conflicts occur
after the electorate passes an amendment, the courts must determine the ramifications of the
amendment on the preexisting, discordant provisions. Id. The court makes these determinations
without the benefit of hearings, debates, or other legislative history to assist them. Id.
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various governmental functions." ' Third, the court determines
whether the component parts or aspects of the proposed amendment
have a natural relation and connection as a single dominant plan or
scheme.119 According to Fine, a proposed amendment must have a
logical and natural single purpose. 120 In 1993, the court opined that
the reason for the single-subject restriction is to prevent "logroll-
ing. ''121
An initiative may be removed from the ballot only if its challengers
show that it is "clearly and conclusively defective."' 122 The court gen-
erally will find a proposal that fails to satisfy any part of the single-
subject test to be "clearly and conclusively defective" and will remove
the proposed amendment from the ballot.
In addition to the single-subject requirement, a proposal must give
fair notice. 2 In 1980, the Legislature amended section 101.161 of the
Florida Statutes to require a proposal's ballot title and summary be
written in clear and unambiguous language.'1 This amendment was to
ensure fair notice of a proposal's purpose and effect. 2 The court has
construed fair notice to mean actual notice. 26
D. Initiatives That Made Ballot Position
Constitutional and statutory requirements prevent many initiatives
from making ballot position. Since 1976, sixteen of ninety-four com-
mittees have collected the required number of signatures. 2 7 Several of
the sixteen initiatives were subsequently removed from the ballot by
the Florida Supreme Court prior to the general election.128 Voters
adopted seven of the eleven initiatives which gained ballot position
118. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990 ("Such a violation has been determined to be a functional
restraint, as opposed to a locational restraint; i.e., the amendment must affect only one function
of government."); see also Albury, supra note 114, at 361-62.
119. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990 (quoting City of Coral Gables v. Gray, 19 So. 2d 318, 320 (Fla.
1944) ("Unity of object and plan is the universal test.").
120. Id.
121. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997, 999
(Fla. 1993). Logrolling occurs when a proposed amendment combines unrelated provisions,
some of which electors might support, in order to pass an otherwise disfavored provision. Id.
122. Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 1976) (citing Goldner v. Adams, 167 So.
2d 565 (Fla. 1964)).
123. FiA. STAT. § 101.161 (1995).
124. Id.
125. Grose v. Firestone, 422 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982).
126. Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 154 (Fla. 1982).
127. CrnzEN INrrArlVE, supra note 3, at 20.
128. Id.
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and rejected four. 29 Voters have adopted or disapproved the follow-
ing initiatives in general elections:
Initiative
Ethics in Government
Casino Gambling
State Operated Lotteries
Casino Gambling
Limitation of Non-Economic
Damages
English Is the Official Language
of Florida
Eight Is Enough
Save Our Homes
Limited Casinos
Limiting Marine Net Fishing
Revenue Limits
Action
Adopted
Not adopted
Adopted
Not adopted
Not Adopted
Adopted
Adopted
Adopted
Not Adopted
Adopted
Adopted 30
Citizen use of initiatives is increasing in popularity. For the 1994
general election, twenty-six constitutional initiative committees regis-
tered with the Division of Elections of the Department of State to ex-
press their intent to collect signatures for twenty-nine initiative
petitions.' Six of these committees gathered the requisite number of
signatures for ballot position. 132 The supreme court removed from the
ballot six of the ten initiatives because they failed to meet constitu-
tional or statutory requirements.' 3 3 Of the four initiatives the supreme
court approved, one did not meet the signature requirements. 34 Thus,
only three initiatives were on the ballot in the 1994 general election.'35
To date, twenty-two initiative committees, some with multiple pro-
posals, filed with the Department of State to attempt to gain ballot
position for thirty-three initiatives in 1996.136 Many committees that
did not meet signature requirements before the 1994 election are
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. The court removed the following initiatives: Laws Related to Discrimination, re-
moved March 4, 1994; Save Our Everglades, removed May 26, 1994; Stop Early Release of
Prisoners, removed July 7, 1994; Voter Approval of New Taxes, removed October 4, 1994; Tax
Limitations, removed October 4, 1994; Property Rights, removed October 4, 1994. Id.
134. Id. The Funding for Criminal Justice initiative did not meet signature requirements. Id.
135. Id.
136. Interview with Division of Elections, Fla. Dept. of State (Feb. 7, 1996) (notes on file
with Fla. S. Comm. on Gov't Reform & Oversight, Tallahassee, Fla.).
Year
1976
1978
1986
1986
1988
1988
1992
1992
1994
1994
1994
1995]
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continuing their efforts for the 1996 ballot. 37 Some committees' peti-
tions have been reviewed by the supreme court.' 3 Some of these initia-
tive petitions may be more appropriate as statutory amendments;
however, the lack of a statutory initiative process in Florida precludes
that choice. 3 9
A review of the initiative processes in other states reveals many sim-
ilarities to and some significant differences from Florida's constitu-
tional initiative process. This comparison is instructive when
evaluating Florida's present process and suggests that Florida should
consider devising a new statutory initiative process. Specifically,
Florida should consider other states' signature requirements, restric-
tions, and voter approval provisions.'"0 Likewise, scrutiny of indirect
statutory initiative processes illustrates that this method provides in-
creased public participation and encourages comment and debate.1 4'
VI. THE PROCESSES IN OTHER STATES
Twenty-four states have some form of citizen initiative process for
amending their constitutions or statutes.142 Fifteen of these states have
an initiative process for amending their constitution and statutes.1
43
Six states limit the initiative process to amending or enacting
statutes.'" Florida is one of three states that provide a method for
citizens to amend the constitution only. 45 Conversely, the majority of
states do not authorize any form of initiative.
The methods of amending constitutions or enacting statutes by ini-
tiative are characterized as either direct or indirect.'" A direct method
of amending the constitution or enacting statutes places an issue di-
rectly on the ballot once constitutional or statutory requirements are
137. Id.
138. See Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Casino Authorization, Taxation, and Regulation,
656 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1995) (holding that proposal's title and summary were misleading and could
not appear on the 1996 ballot); Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Fla. Locally Approved Gam-
ing, 656 So. 2d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 1995) (holding that this casino gambling initiative met single-
subject and title/summary requirements and that the proposal can appear on the ballot in 1996).
139. See CIzTIEN INITIATIV, supra note 3, at 72.
140. See id. at 73.
141. Id.
142. Neal, supra note 26, at 1. The following states have initiative processes: Alaska, Ari-
zona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
143. Id. (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota).
144. Id. (Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
145. Id. The remaining two states are Illinois and Mississippi. Id.
146. Id.
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met. 47 The public then adopts or rejects the provisions in a general
election.14 The indirect method generally allows the legislature to act
on a proposal prior to its being put on the ballot. ' 9
The initiative processes vary in each state; however, there are cer-
tain aspects common to all. The processes generally require 1) com-
mittee registration and filing of the petition with a designated state
official; 2) a review of the petition for compliance with statutory re-
quirements including review of the proposal's language, ballot title,
and summary; 3) signature of the petition by a specified percentage of
voters; and 4) verification of the signatures by the state elections offi-
cer. 50
A. Constitutional Initiatives
Eighteen states have constitutional initiative processes.' 5' Of those,
sixteen states allow for direct constitutional initiatives.' Florida has a
direct constitutional initiative process similar to other states' pro-
cesses; these states' methods do not vary significantly.'53 Mississippi
and Massachusetts are the only two states that have an indirect consti-
tutional initiative process. 154 These indirect processes require that the
proposal be submitted to the Legislature before being placed on the
ballot. The Legislatures may then take one of several actions. Though
the Mississippi Legislature can adopt, amend, or reject an initiative,
the proposal still goes on the ballot.155 If the Legislature alters the
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at2.
151. CoUtcn. OF STATE GoV'Ts, THE BOOK OF STATES 294 tbl. 5.15 (1994-95). These states
are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
South Dakota. Id.
152. Id. In addition to Florida, the states using a direct constitutional process are: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. Id.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 159-74.
154. CouNcL. OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 151, at 294 tbl. 5.15.
155. Miss. CONST. art. 15, § 273. The Mississippi Constitution provides for legislative review
of the initiative petition prior to the proposal being placed on the ballot. The Legislature may
adopt, amend, or reject the proposal. Id.; see also CrrZN INrnATrv, supra note 3, at 28 (ex-
plaining Mississippi's process). Regardless of the legislative action, the initiative is placed on the
ballot for the next general election. CrrTzEN INirnATrvE, supra note 3, at 28. However, the Legis-
lature may pass an amended version of, or an alternative to, the initiative. Miss. CONST. art. 15,
§ 273. Both the original initiative and the Legislature's proposed alternative initiative are placed
on the ballot, along with a fiscal analysis of each proposal prepared by the legislative budget
officer. Id. The Mississippi Constitution requires that 12% of the voters sign the initiative peti-
tion and limits the number of initiatives on one ballot to five. Id.
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initiative, both proposals go on the ballot, and voters may choose be-
tween them.'56 The Massachusetts Legislature can prevent the initia-
tive from reaching the ballot at all. 57 However, Massachusetts has the
lowest percentage of signatures required for ballot placement-three
percent of the votes cast for Governor in the previous election.'
Therefore, Massachusetts' legislative latitude could be attributed to its
low signature requirement and used as a filter for some unwise initia-
tives.
B. Statutory Initiatives
Twenty-one states have statutory initiative processes. 59 Fourteen of
those states have direct methods 6° and nine have indirect methods. 6'
Utah and Washington have both indirect and direct statutory initiative
processes.' 62 Two other states offer an indirect statutory initiative and
a direct constitutional initiative. 63
156. Id.
157. MAss. CoNsT. art. 48, pt. 4, § 2 (requiring a 25% vote of both legislative houses in two
consecutive sessions).
158. Id.
159. CAoI.ORnA CoMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE-SHAPINO
CAnLIFotIm's FouRTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 359 (1992) [hereinafter DEmocRACY BY lNrriA-
TI'E]. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
160. Id. (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming).
161. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 151, at 294 tbl. 5.15 (Alaska, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming). The District of Columbia
also has an indirect statutory process. Id.
162. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § l(a); see also DEMOCRACY BY INrtA-
TrvE, supra note 159, at 359. Utah statutes provide for submission to the Legislature of any
measure accompanied by the signatures of 50 of the voters, 10 days prior to convening of the
Legislature. UTAH STAT. § 20-11-2 (1995). If the measure is not enacted by the Legislature, signa-
tures totalling an additional 5 7s, for a total of 10% of the votes cast for governor in the preced-
ing election, must be collected to submit the proposal to the voters. Id. However, filing a
petition with the signatures of 10% of the voters gets the measure directly to the voters. UTAH
STAT. § 20-11-3 (1995). Unlike Utah, Washington has no provision for a constitutional initiative.
WASH. CONsT. art. 1, § l(a) (1994). Both the direct and indirect statutory initiatives require the
signatures of 80o of the voters prior to placement on the ballot. Id. If an indirect initiative is
adopted by the Legislature, it still goes on the ballot as a referendum. Id.
163. MICH. CONsT. art. 2, § 9; NE. CONST. art. 29, § 2; see also DEMOCRACY BY INsTITVE,
supra note 159, at 359. The Michigarr and Nevada constitutions provide for legislative review of
the proposal. MIcH. CONsT. art. 2, § 9; NE. CONsT. art. 29, § 2. The Michigan Legislature may
propose an alternative measure. MIcH. CONST. art. 2, § 9. The Michigan Constitution provides
that if the Legislature does not enact or reject a proposed measure within 40 session days, the
citizens vote on the initiative measure and any proposed alternative measure. Id.
The Nevada Constitution requires a committee to file its petition within 30 days prior to the
legislative session. NEy. CONST. art. 29, § 2. If the Legislature fails to act within 40 days, the
petition is submitted to the voters. Id. If the Legislature enacts the proposed amendment as a
statute, it becomes law, but subject to referendum. Id.
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Several states with indirect methods allow their legislatures to pro-
pose alternative measures to a statutory initiative. For example, the
Maine Constitution establishes an indirect statutory initiative and pro-
vides that the Legislature may enact the initiative measure as is or pro-
pose an alternative.'64 Alaska and Wyoming have a modified version
of an indirect statutory initiative procedure.1 65 These constitutions
provide that one legislative session must fall between the filing and
balloting of an initiative.'6 Enactment of substantially the same meas-
ure by the Legislature terminates the measure's appearance on the bal-
lot.' 67 Some states require that a statutory initiative be submitted to
the legislature and, if not adopted, that the committee obtain more
signatures prior to the proposal's placement on the ballot. 68
Eleven states permit their legislatures to amend or repeal statutory
initiatives by a simple majority vote of both houses. 169 However, six
states impose limited restrictions on legislative changes. 170 In those
states, generally, amendment or repeal is prohibited for two to three
years after enactment of a statutory initiative. 7' Four states impose
major restrictions on legislative amendments. 172 California, for exam-
ple, requires that any effort to amend a statutory initiative must be
approved by the voters. 173 Michigan, Arkansas, and North Dakota re-
quire a two-thirds to three-fourths vote of the Legislature for amend-
ment. 
74
C. Signature Requirements
Signature requirements vary throughout the states. Generally, con-
stitutional initiative petitions need more signatures than statutory
164. MAINE CoNST. art. 4, pt. 3, § 18.
165. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1; WYo. CoNsr. ch. 24, § 22-24-101.
166. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4; Wyo. ComsT. ch. 24, § 22-24-119.
167. Id.
168. See Osno CONST. art. II, § lb; MAss. CONST. art. 48, pt. V, § 1. The Ohio Constitution
provides that the Legislature receives an initiative petition after it is signed by 3o of the voters.
Ono CONST. art. II, § lb. The citizens vote on either the original measure or the legislatively-
amended measure if the Legislature fails to act within 4 months and the additional 3% of voters
sign the petition. Id.
The Massachusetts Constitution provides that the Legislature gets a proposal after 3% of the
registered voters sign the petition. MAsS. CONST. art. 48, pt. V, § 1. If the Legislature fails to act
within the allotted time, and if the signatures of an additional 1/2% of the voters are submitted,
the measure and any alternatives proposed by the Legislature are put before the voters. Id.
169. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 159, at 366.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Id. (Arkansas, California, Michigan, and North Dakota).
173. Id.
174. Id. In North Dakota, this requirement is necessary only for the first seven years after
the initiative's enactment. Id.
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initiative petitions.17 Of the fifteen states that have both constitu-
tional and statutory initiative processes, thirteen require more signa-
tures for constitutional initiatives than for statutory initiatives. 76 Four
states require approximately twice as many signatures for constitu-
tional amendments as for statutory amendments. 77 Seven states re-
quire from approximately twenty-five to fifty percent more signatures
for constitutional amendments than statutory amendments. 78
The basis for signatures is usually the total number of eligible vot-
ers,179 the total number of voters who voted in the last gubernatorial
election, 80 or the total number of voters who voted in the last
presidential election.' Requirements based on the total number of
175. COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'Ts, supra note 151, at 296-97 tbl. 5.17.
176. Id.
State Constitu- Statutory Vote Based Upon Percent of.
tional
Arizona 15%0 10% total votes cast for governor in last
election
Arkansas 10% 8% total votes cast for governor in last
election
California 8% 50 total votes cast for governor in last
election
Colorado 5% 5070 total votes cast for the office of Sec-
retary of State
Massachusetts 3% 3% total votes cast for governor in last
election
Michigan 10% 8016 total votes cast for governor in the
last election
Missouri 8% 5016 total votes cast for governor in last
election
Montana 10% 5% total votes cast for governor in last
election
Nebraska 10% 7% total eligible voters
Nevada 100%0 10% total voters at the last election
North 4% 2% resident population
Dakota
Ohio 10% 3% total votes cast for governor in last
election
Oklahoma 1507o 8% voters for the office receiving highest
number of votes in last election
Oregon 807 6% total votes cast for governor in last
election
South 10% 5% total votes cast for governor in last
Dakota election
Id.
177. Id. (Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota).
178. Id. (Arizona, California, Missouri, Nebraska, Michigan, Oregon, and Arkansas).
179. Id. (i.e., Arkansas and Nebraska).
180. Id. (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, and South Dakota).
181. Id. (Florida).
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eligible voters makes the percentage more difficult to attain. For ex-
ample, in Florida, only sixty-five percent of the eligible (registered)
voters actually voted in the 1994 general election.182 Therefore, the sig-
nature requirement is easier to satisfy. In comparison, North Dakota
requires four percent of the entire resident population to sign a peti-
tion. ' Six states, including Florida, require that signatures be gath-
ered from around the state. 1 4 These requirements specify that
signatures must be from voters registered in multiple counties or from
congressional or state legislative districts." 5
D. Restrictions on Initiatives
Several states restrict the areas of law that initiatives may amend.18 6
For example, the Alaska Constitution provides that an initiative can-
not dedicate revenues, make or repeal appropriations, create courts,
define jurisdiction of courts, prescribe court rules, or enact local or
special legislation. 17 The Illinois Constitution allows amendment only
to the section in the constitution governing the legislative branch.'88
The Oklahoma Constitution provides that when voters reject measures
through initiative and referendum, such measures cannot be proposed
again within three years without signatures of at least twenty-five per-
cent of the state's voters.5 9
States commonly use the single-subject limitation, as Florida does.
Thirteen of the eighteen states with constitutional initiative processes
and twelve of the twenty-two states with statutory initiatives impose a
single-subject restriction. ,90
E. Voter Approval
In most states, a vote of a simple majority can enact citizen initia-
tive proposals. Four states require some type of super-majority of the
182. Division of Elections Interview, supra note 7.
183. COUNCI OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 151, at 297 tbl. 5.17.
184. Id. (Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, and Ohio).
185. Id.
186. In Wyoming, initiatives may not dedicate revenues, make or repeal appropriations, cre-
ate courts, or enact local or special legislation. WYo. STAT. § 22-24-101 (1993). Similarly, the
Massachusetts Constitution prohibits citizen initiative proposals relating to religion, the appoint-
ment of judges, reversal of judicial decisions, powers and creation of courts, local matters, and
specific appropriations. MAsS. CONST. art. 48, pt. V, § 2. The Missouri Constitution does not
permit appropriation initiatives unless new sources of revenue are also included. Mo. COmST. art.
III, § 51. The Ohio Constitution does not permit initiatives that amend the state's property
taxation method. OHIO CONST. art II, § l(e).
187. ALAsKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
188. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
189. OK1.A. CONST. art. V, § 6.
190. DEMOCRACY nY INITrATVa, supra note 159, at 362.
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total votes cast at that election or a previous election.19' The Nebraska
and Massachusetts constitutions provide that a majority vote may
adopt an initiative if the majority totals at least thirty or thirty-five
percent, respectively, of the total votes cast in the election. 9 2 Nevada
requires a majority vote in two consecutive elections to approve an
initiative. 93 Illinois requires at least a three-fifths majority vote to ap-
prove a constitutional amendment.'19
F. The California Experience
California has had an initiative process since 1911.19 The prevalent
use of California's initiative process is an interesting case study and
illustrates the overall concerns regarding initiatives.196 Observers of the
California process fear that initiatives have "shifted the policymaking
burden to the voters, leaving them overwhelmed by the growing num-
ber of measures on the ballot, confused by poor drafting, [and]
deceived by misleading campaigns. ... ," 19
Constitutional and statutory initiatives are a significant generator of
California's policy and are "exerting a major impact on the life of the
state." 98 The number of initiatives California citizens have circulated
and adopted has increased fivefold since the 1960s.199 In the past ten
years, voters have approved more than twenty-five initiatives at the
polls.200 Those initiatives have instituted policy in important areas
such as education, insurance, taxes, the environment, rent control,
and crime prevention.20' Some initiatives are highly controversial; for
example, Proposition 187, which was adopted in the 1994 general
election, denies public education, non-emergency health, and public
social services to those who are not legally in this country.202 If
191. Id. at 366.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 5. California requires signatures of 8% of the registered voters for constitutional
initiatives and 5% of that same group for statutory initiatives. CouNCIL OF STATE Gov'rS, supra
note 151, at 296 tbl. 5.17.
196. See DEMOCRACY By INrrITATivE, supra note 159, at 2.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 8.
199. Id.
200. The National Conference on State Legislatures states that, since 1984, the electorate
decided on 61 initiatives, and adopted 11 of 26 constitutional initiatives and 14 of 35 statutory
initiatives.
201. Id. at 1.
202. Telephone Interview with Melissa Melendez, Cal. Senate Off. of Research (Oct. 21,
1995) (notes on file with Fla. S. Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, Tallahassee, Fla.)
[hereinafter Melendez Interview].
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California's trend is any predictor of the nation's future, other states
will begin to see the emergence of "democracy by initiative as a new
form of twenty-first century governance. "203
Further, spending on initiatives has risen. In 1976, the median cost
to get an initiative on the ballot was approximately $45 ,000.204 In the
1990s, the median cost of an initiative has exploded to more than $1
million.205 The cost of placing initiatives on the ballot has created an
initiative industry in California to raise funds and gather signatures. 206
This development raises questions about the true "grassroots" nature
of initiatives.207
The counter-initiative is a new strategy for undermining an initiative
proposal and is gaining popularity in California.01 Instead of oppos-
ing a measure by advocating a negative vote, opponents run an alter-
native measure. 201 A problem develops when voters approve two or
more initiatives addressing conflicting propositions. 210 This problem
occurs in other states; however, most other states prescribe that the
proposal with the most votes prevails. 21 Conflicting propositions inev-
itably confuse California voters and complicate the court's job when
it must determine which elements in the proposals conflict.
Critical problems confront California's initiative process.212 Various
California commissions have studied and proposed reforms to the
process. 213 These commissions recommended that it should be harder
to amend the constitution and that initiatives should be approved by a
three-fifths vote.214 They also recommended that the Legislature hold
public hearings on each initiative qualified for the ballot and that pro-
ponents be allowed to amend their initiative after the legislative
hearing.2" 5 Public hearings would identify drafting problems,
constitutionality issues, costs of implementation, and other issues that
could be resolved by modification of the proposed initiative. 16
Further, the commissions recommended that the process be revised to
203. D MocRAcy BY INITATIvE, supra note 159, at 1.
204. Id. at 13.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 15.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 363.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id, at 3.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 4.
215. Id,
216. Id.
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allow amendments to statutory initiatives without the approval of the
electorate. 21 7 To date, California has not adopted these revisions.',
G. Florida Compared with Other States
Florida is one of only three states that allow constitutional initia-
tives without allowing statutory initiatives.1 9 The other two states in
this category, Illinois and Mississippi, have more restrictive initiative
processes than Florida.2
Of the eighteen states with constitutional initiative processes, ten
states require more signatures than Florida,221 four other states require
approximately the same number,m and only three states require
fewer.22 Many states, including Florida, limit the time permitted to
circulate petitions to gather the requisite number of signatures.22 The
shortest period for circulation is in Oklahoma-ninety days. 22 Cali-
fornia allows 150 days for circulating petitions, and several other
states allow periods ranging from six months to two years.2 6 Florida
allows the longest period of any state-four years. 227
Although Florida has only a constitutional initiative process, its ini-
tiative process shares many similarities with the processes of other
states. Most states have a single-subject limitation2 and require some
form of disclosure of initiative contributionsY 9 Most states also re-
quire pre-election judicial review of the initiative's procedural
compliance.23 0 All states require review and approval of the ballot title
217. Id. California is the only state that does not permit amendment of statutory initiatives
without the general electorate's approval unless the initiative specifically allows legislative
amendment. Id. at 366.
218. Melendez Interview, supra note 202.
219. CouNciL oF STATE Gov'rs, supra note 151, at 297 tbl. 5.17.
220. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Illinois has a direct constitutional initiative process. How-
ever, initiative amendments may propose changes only to article IV of the Illinois Constitution,
which governs the legislative branch. Id. Mississippi has an indirect constitutional method; the
Legislature reviews all proposals. MIss. CONST. art. XV, § 273. All proposals ultimately get
ballot position, but only after public hearings, analysis, and an opportunity for the Legislature
to propose alternative measures. Id.
221. CouNcm oF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 151, at 296 tbl. 5.17.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. FLA. STAT. § 100.371(2) (1995); DamocaAcY By ItrrAArvE, supra note 159, at 130.
228. DEMOCRACY BY INrrATriv, supra note 159, at 362.
229. Id. at 361.
230. Id. at 362.
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and summary.23' Also, in general, a simple majority vote can adopt an
initiative.
23 2
VII. IssuEs REGARDING THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
Initiatives and their effect on democracy are likely to continue to be
a subject of national debate as they become a more prevalent method
of determining government policy in the states. The general question
arises whether initiatives are an infringement on the representative
form of government or a necessary avenue of direct legislation for the
people when the elected officials either cannot, or will not, pass laws
which reflect the wishes of the people.233 A previous joint committee
study explained:
Initiative ... procedures raise significant questions about the type of
democracy that should be encouraged. Representative democracy, as
designed in the United States, is based on a division of power. Direct
democracy combines power and, as such, raises the possibility that
democratic values which secure rights for minorities and those
adhering to life styles and beliefs different from those of the
majority will be undermined. . . For every negative claim, there is a
positive justification for citizen lawmaking. . . . [Some] argue
initiatives and referenda help make elected officials more
accountable and serve as a vital safety valve for issues that might
otherwise fracture legislative bodies.2
4
In reference to constitutional initiatives specifically, one scholar
states that "[tihe principal advantage of the constitutional initiative is
its availability as a popular weapon to counter domination of legisla-
tive assemblies by pressure groups that oppose constitutional
change." 233 Constitutional initiatives enable citizens to "propos[e] al-
terations without depending on existing governmental institutions.
' 236
However, critics argue that the constitutional initiative process "en-
courages proposals by selfish interests, that it may result in the addi-
tion of more statutory content to the organic law, that many
popularly initiated measures cannot be integrated into the existing
legal structure, that proposals are often poorly drafted, and that they
further lengthen the ballot.' '27
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See INrATIVES & REFERENDA, supra note 31, at 158-160.
234. Id.
235. STURMu, supra note 11, at 26.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 27.
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Nonetheless, many Floridians have indicated a desire to retain the
constitutional initiative process.28 However, many concerns have been
identified with regard to Florida's current constitutional initiative
process.23 9 These issues warrant continued review and potential re-
dress.°
A. Preserving the Sanctity of the Constitution
Citizen initiatives present conflicting political principles. One such
principle is that a constitution belongs to the people, and the people
should not have to rely on methods that may frustrate their will to
alter the document2 4Y However, a second notion is "that the state
constitution is the heart of the social contract" and, if it is to work
properly, the constitution cannot be altered to the point that govern-
ment does not function properly.2 42 Thus, a primary concern of the
constitutional initiative process is that the constitution should contain
fundamental principles of policy and be difficult to amend.
Constitutions are generally considered timeless documents that
should be drafted in such a way as to need very little modification.
"The Constitution is a document that should transcend changes in the
political scene, hot issues, and capricious motives." 4 It is a document
that is to "provide stability in the law and society's consensus on the
general fundamental values. "2" Statutory law, however, is intended to
be easily modified whenever the needs of the state and its people
change.
There is common agreement that state constitutions should be brief,
limited to fundamentals, and avoid all legislative matters. ' 5 Treating a
subject in a state constitution, as opposed to codifying it in statutory
law, places the matter beyond change by normal lawmaking processes
and at the highest level of the legal authority of the state.2 The
238. See CrrrzaTt lrrATrvE, supra note 3, at 35-52.
239. Id. at 54. Constitutional scholars, previous initiative committee members, interested
parties, and state officers identified these concerns in a survey about Florida's initiative process.
Id. at 33-52.
240. Id. at 33-52.
241. Id. at 54 (quoting Professor Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Stetson University College of Law).
242. Id.
243. Nancy Maggiacomo, League Litigates on a Constitutional Question, FLA. VOTER, Fall
1994.
244. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997, 1000
(Fla. 1993).
245. Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L.
REv. 928, 942-47 (1968); FLA. ADvs. COUNCIL INTERGVTL. REL., M-59 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL.
LAW CASES AND MATERuALS 28 (1988) (hereinafter STATE CONSTITUIONAL LAW CASES].
246. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES, supra note 245, at 29.
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enduring quality of a provision of the state constitution may protect a
desirable policy from unnecessary changes by the legislature, or it may
delay or prevent change from policy which is no longer responsive to
the state's current needs for new and better policy.247
To preserve the sanctity of the Florida Constitution, the Florida
Legislature could propose changes to increase the percentage of signa-
tures required to place an initiative on the ballot, restrict the subject
matter of initiatives, or require a larger majority for voter approval.
Also, instituting a statutory initiative process would decrease the rela-
tive number of constitutional amendments and revisions.
1. The Constitution Should Be Difficult To Amend
Providing citizens an opportunity to amend the constitution by ini-
tiative may be desirable public policy; however, the constitution
should not be easy to amend.2 48 The constitution "set[s] society's basic
legal parameters" by defining legal rights.2 49 "To be effective, consti-
tutions must be difficult to change. Yet constitutions must be capable
of change. . . to address the important issues of the day." 250
Florida provides five methods for amending the constitution; this is
a higher number than any other state. Since the constitution was re-
vised in 1968, ninety-seven amendments have been proposed, and vot-
ers have adopted seventy-three of them.25" ' Voters adopted seven of
eleven citizen initiative proposals which made ballot position.2 2
For 1994, twenty-nine initiatives were filed with the Division of
Elections. 5 This is the largest number of initiatives ever circulated in
one election period in Florida.254 Other states also have experienced a
tremendous increase in the number of initiative petitions for constitu-
tional or statutory amendment.2 5 In the 1994 general elections, voters
in twenty-two states considered seventy-three amendments.256 This
number reflects only those initiatives which met all constitutional and
247. Id.
248. CITIES INITIATrv, supra note 3, at 35-52 (including survey responses about the initia-
tive process from selected scholars, former members of a Constitution Revision Commission,
and other interested parties).
249. Stephen Maher, The Conference on the Florida Constitution, 68 FLA. B. J. 66 (1994).
250. Id.
251. CITIZEN INITIATTVE, supra note 3, at 55.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 54.
254. Id.
255. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 159, at 8.
256. Press Release from Public Affs. Research Inst. N.J., Inc., Princeton (March 13, 1995)
(entitled $140 Million Spent on Citizen Initiative Questions) (on file with Fla. S. Comm. on
Gov't Reform & Oversight, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter Press Release].
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statutory requirements . 57 Many other initiatives were attempted. Spe-
cial interest groups have become very effective in gathering the requi-
site number of signatures to place initiatives on the ballot.2 8 The
Florida experience and that of other states suggests that amendments
will be proposed to the Florida Constitution with increasing fre-
quency.259 Judge Thomas Barkdull stated that, based on the experi-
ence of other states, Florida may be on the "verge of getting into a
position where every two years [voters] will have four or five petitions
to consider.'"' He further speculated that future constitution revision
commissions may consider adopted measures "sacrosanct" and may
be reluctant to revise the amendments because of a perception that
they are a mandate from the people.26'
Furthermore, in 1994, the citizenry voted in favor of an amendment
to the constitution which revised the initiative process to permit reve-
nue-related initiatives to address more than a single subject. This new
amendment could have far-reaching, uncontemplated effects. 62 It is
likely to result in an increase in the number of initiatives which will
make ballot position. Consequently, Florida should consider options
to make it more difficult to amend the constitution by initiative.
2. Suggested Methods of Preservation
The process to amend the constitution could be made more difficult
by requiring more signatures than the current eight percent. Many
states require more signatures than Florida and limit the time for peti-
tion circulation to gather signatures.23 Another option would be to
make certain provisions in the constitution unavailable for amend-
ment by initiative.2 64 The state could determine that certain issues are
257. Id.
258. CITIZEN INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 44 (citing survey response from Sally Spener,
Executive Director of Common Cause Florida).
259. Id. at 34-52. In fact, this same concern extends to proposals by the Legislature, the
Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, by the Constitution
Revision Commission. Id.
260. Id. at 55 (quoting Barkdull, Thomas H., J., Fla. 3d Dis. Ct. App., Member, 1968 and
1978 Constitution Revision Commissions). Judge Barkdull was in attendance at the Leroy Col-
lins Center for Public Policy forum on Florida constitutional issues in Tallahassee, Florida, on
March 6, 1995. Id. The Center conducted the forum to initiate discussion and thought in antici-
pation of the 1998 Constitution Revision Commission. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 35-52 (reporting survey indications of much support for the single-subject limita-
tion, although some persons are dissatisfied with the court's interpretation of the provision).
263. CotmcIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 151, at 296; see also discussion supra part VI.C.
(discussing other states' signature requirements).
264. See CITZEN INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 42; see, e.g., AL sK, CONST. art. XI, § 7; Wyo.
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fundamental to the state's welfare and safety and restrict initiatives
from amending those areas.2 65
A third option would be to require a super-majority vote for pas-
sage. The current initiative process requires for passage only a simple
majority of those voting.2" In 1995, bills were filed in the Florida
House of Representatives and Senate which would have required a
two-thirds or three-fifths vote of the electors for the adoption of con-
stitutional amendments. 267 These bills did not pass.
Any proposal to make it more difficult to amend the constitution
would require a constitutional amendment approved by the electors.
The electorate may not favor an amendment to limit citizen access to
direct democracy. Yet, some may desire to protect the integrity of
their constitution and may weary of others' attempts to amend it, es-
pecially if numerous proposals make it more demanding and difficult
for citizens to stay informed about amendment issues. If citizens have
an alternative avenue to direct democracy, they may approve restrict-
ing, and making more difficult, amendments to the constitution. A
statutory initiative process would help preserve the integrity of the
constitution and provide citizens an alternative method to affect pol-
icy.268
B. Procedural Concerns Regarding the Initiative Process
There are other issues surrounding Florida's constitutional initiative
process that deserve evaluation. These areas of concern are 1) funding
of initiative committees, 2) petition signature procedures, 3) judicial
review procedures, and 4) public awareness of initiative effect.
1. Funding of Initiative Committees
Some of the strongest claims against initiatives focus on their vul-
nerability to special interests and the inability of citizens to make
STAT., § 22-24-101 (1994); ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. In Alaska and Wyoming, for example, the
constitutions prohibit initiatives from dedicating revenues, making or repealing appropriations,
creating courts, or revising the judicial process. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7; Wyo. STAT., § 22-
24-101 (1994). In Illinois, initiatives may only amend constitutional provisions governing the
Legislature. ILL. CO NST. art. XIV, § 3. Some similar restrictions on initiative amendments may
be appropriate for Florida. CrrzEN INrrrrvE, supra note 3, at 42.
265. CITIZEN INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 42 (Professor Joseph W. Little, University of Flor-
ida College of Law, suggests restrictions on initiatives that affect the state's police or regulatory
powers).
266. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
267. Fla. SJR 784 (1994); Fla. SJR 1730(1994); Fla. HJR 383 (1994).
268. CITIZEN INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 6.
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informed choices about the issues. 69 Much concern surrounds large
contributions paid by special interest groups.2 70 According to the Divi-
sion of Elections of the Department of State, committees attempting
to place initiatives on the ballot in 1994 received contributions as high
as $16.5 million.271 Currently, there are no limits on contribution
amounts and only a statutory requirement that all contributions be
reported.2 72 Paradoxically, initiatives were originally conceived for
grassroots groups to circumvent legislative bodies which citizens per-
ceived to be overly influenced by special interests. 273
In 1992, the California Commission on Campaign Financing issued
a study declaring that "ballot access today is less a drive for broad-
based citizen support than an exercise in fundraising strength. 2 74 The
study notes that volunteer signature gatherers have largely been re-
placed with expensive, paid circulators and that for-profit signature-
gathering firms advertise that they will "guarantee ballot qualification
of any initiative-at a price." 275
Some argue that special interests have a significant influence on citi-
zen campaigns. 276 In 1994, campaigns for or against adoption of sev-
enty-three citizen initiatives in twenty-two states consumed
approximately $140 million.2 77 Voters decided two-thirds of those ini-
tiatives in favor of the side reporting the highest spending. 278 In Flor-
ida, the Proposition for Limited Casinos Committee received
contributions in excess of $16.5 million and advertised extensively to
269. See id. at 58. Former Governor Reuben Askew recently highlighted this issue at a con-
ference sponsored by the Leroy Collins Center for Public Policy. Former Governor Askew la-
mented a concern that "anyone with enough money may put an issue on the ballot." This
sentiment is shared by many.
270. CiaTN lNrrIATrvE, supra note 3, at 46. Nancy Maggiacomo, President, League of
Women Voters of Fla., stated that there is concern about the growing influence of monied inter-
ests such as the "gambling interest and U.S. Sugar who clearly financed amendments which
would personally benefit their industries." Id.
271. See id. at 59. Proposition for Limited Casinos ($16.5 million cash and $335,701 in-kind
contributions); Florida Locally Approved Gambling ($3.1 million cash and $1.1 in-kind contri-
butions); Save Our Sealife ($1.4 million cash and $303,349 in-kind contributions); Save Our
Everglades ($1.3 million cash and $9,679 in-kind contributions; Home Rule Committee ($1.3
million cash and $170,275 in-kind contributions); Citizens for a Safe Florida ($1.02 million cash
and $124,897 in-kind contributions); Tax Cap Committee ($62,640 cash and $1.26 million in-
kind contributions). Id.
272. FLA. STAT. § 106.08 (1995).
273. See CrrmzN IirriAvE, supra note 3, at 40, 59 (quoting Professor Joel Mintz, Nova
Southeastern University Law Center); id. at 42 (quoting Professor Joseph W. Little, University
of Florida College of Law).
274. DEMOCRA Y BY INrrATw, supra note 159, at 15.
275. Id. at 145.
276. IrrxrrVs & RFFERENDA, supra note 31, at 6-7.
277. Press Release, supra note 256.
278. Id.
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promote the casino initiative.2 79 However, despite generating the high-
est contributions, the initiative did not pass. This suggests that financ-
ing alone does not ensure passage of an initiative in Florida.
Nevertheless, it appears that adequate fundraising may at least as-
sure the collection of the requisite number of signatures. To
counteract the effects of paid advertising, Florida could institute a
process for public hearings on initiatives and provide for the dissemi-
nation of unbiased summaries of initiatives.2' o In addition, Florida
could place a ceiling on contributions made by a single individual or
group to a particular committee-a ceiling similar to the limitations
placed on contributions to political candidates. 2 ' These are options
which Florida should review further.
2. Initiative Petition Signatures
To obtain ballot position, sponsors must gather valid signatures
equal to eight percent of the preceding presidential vote in Florida.212
Based on this requirement, an initiative committee had to obtain
429,428 signatures to gain position on the 1994 ballot. 23 Problems
exist with the various aspects of the initiative signature process. These
concerns include the effect of paid signature gatherers, signature veri-
fication, and petition deadlines.
In addition, there are concerns about the financial aspects of the
signature process. Some committees fail to pay for signature verifica-
tion, while administrative costs associated with processing the initia-
tive petitions are increasing. 24 Supervisors of elections reported
additional administrative costs associated with the initiative petitions
filed in 1994; such costs ranged from a low of $100 in a small county
to more than $100,000 in a larger county.21 These additional costs
consisted mainly of salaries paid to temporary help and overtime for
permanent employees for signature verification., 6
279. Id. (reporting that $16.5 million spent by the Proposition for Limited Casino Commit-
tee was the most spent in 1994, and noting that the most ever spent was $35 million in 1988 for
California's Proposition 104 to impose no-fault automobile insurance).
280. DEMOCRACY BY Irtr1ArvE, supra note 159, at 21. The California report recommends
holding public hearings on the merits of any initiative once a committee collects 2501o percent of
the required signatures. Id. Several states issue pamphlets with unbiased summaries of initiatives.
Id. at 364. However, Florida would incur significant costs conducting hearings and printing pub-
lications. Id.
281. CrrIzEN I rrrErva, supra note 3, at 59.
282. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (requiring signatures of 8% of the electors in one-half of the
state's congressional districts and in the state as a whole on a petition).
283. CrrzN INrriArrvE, supra note 3, at 62.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 62.
286. Id.
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a. Paid Signature Gatherers
Many individuals and groups have recommended that the Legisla-
ture preclude initiative committees from paying signature gatherers.
287
The recommendation results from a concern that paid signature
gatherers "pressure" individuals to sign petitions which they may not
understand. 218 As well, paying signature gatherers per signature may
encourage fraudulent signatures. 289
Signature gathering can be lucrative. Some initiative committees
pay signature gatherers up to $2.50 per signature. 290 An average
worker can collect 200 signatures per day, while energetic gatherers
can collect up to 500.291 Allegedly, the increase in the cost of paying
signature gatherers alone ensures that $1 million is needed to finance
an initiative. 292 The Safe Bet for Florida initiative committee report-
edly spent more than $1.4 million to hire a company to gather signa-
tures for its effort. 293
The Supervisor of Elections for Collier County indicated that there
were numerous petitions submitted with high rates of signature inva-
lidity.294 One initiative committee delivered 10,087 petition signatures,
of which only 697 were valid.29S The supervisor was able to demon-
strate that someone copied data from telephone books.296 The supervi-
sor forwarded the information to the State Attorney in Collier
County.2 97 Fraud was also widespread in Pinellas County last election
year. 298 One initiative petition included names of deceased persons. 299
Many supervisors of elections have noted a correlation between
fraudulent signatures and paid signature gathering. 30 Supervisors
generally agree that paid signature gathering provides an incentive for
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 62.
291. Id. (reporting information provided by Kelly Kimball, President of Kimball Petition
Management, a Los Angeles company which collected petition signatures for the Limited Casi-
nos amendment defeated in November 1994).
292. See Democracy and Dollars, NEws-PRass, July 14, 1994, at 1.
293. Gary Fineout, Gambling Initiative Dies; Backers Blame Leon, TAIL. DEM., Aug. 10,
1994, at Al.
294. CITIEN INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 63 (quoting Mary W. Morgan, Collier County Su-
pervisor of Elections).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. (quoting Dot Ruggles, Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections).
299. Steve Nichol, Forgeries Found on Petitions, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., July 6. 1994, at BI.
300. CrTzEw INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 33.
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fraud.30 1 In Leon County, fifty-two percent of the signatures gathered
by paid workers on the casino-gambling petitions were invalid. 02
However, only ten percent of the signatures gathered by volunteers
for the Save our Sealife petition were invalid.303 Election officials in
Hillsborough and Leon counties have reported cases of apparent sig-
nature forgeries. 304 In Leon County, pursuant to section 837.06, Flor-
ida Statutes, the State prosecuted five individuals for false official
statements.305 Each individual confessed to signing names of registered
voters to the petitions and entered plea bargains.1°
Seemingly, the Legislature should consider prohibiting paid signa-
ture gatherers. 307 However, in Meyer v. Grant, 30 the United States Su-'
preme Court held that the First Amendment protects circulation of
initiative petitions. Petition circulation involves the type of interactive
communication regarding political change that is appropriately de-
scribed as "core political speech. ' ' 309 The Court held that
[tlhe refusal to permit appellees to pay petition circulators restricts
political expression in two ways: First, it limits the number of voices
who will convey appellees' message and the hours they can speak
and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach.
Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number
of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus
limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide
discussion 10
Consequently, laws prohibiting payment for signature gathering
may be unconstitutional. Since Meyer, North Dakota has enacted a
law which allows committees to pay signature gatherers on an hourly
or salary basis but precludes payment on a per signature or bonus ba-
sis.3" No one has challenged the law yet, and it is unclear whether it is
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting Ion Sancho, Leon County Supervisor of Elections).
303. Id.
304. Id. (quoting Ion Sancho, Leon County Supervisor of Elections, and Pam Iorio, Hills-
borough County Supervisor of Elections).
305. See State v. Wagner, No. C94-13176-AMI (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1995); State v.
Eldridge, No. C94-12086-AMI (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 16, 1994); State v. Gaffney, No. C94-
12087-AMI (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 16, 1994); State v. Grey, No. C94-12088 AMI (Fla. 2d Cir.
Ct. Nov. 16, 1994); State v. Mitchell, No. C94-12089 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 16, 1994).
306. See supra note 305 and accompanying text. The individuals were required to do com-
munity service and to pay restitution to the Leon County Supervisor of Elections Office.
307. CITIZEN INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 63.
308. 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988).
309. Id. at 1892.
310. Id.
311. DEmocLAcY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 159, at 143 (citing N.C. CENT. CODE § 6.1-01-12
(1988)).
1995]
450 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:417
constitutional. At this time, court decisions indicate that limiting or
precluding paid signature gatherers may not be a viable option." 2
Further review of the prohibitions of payment on a per signature or
bonus basis is desirable.
Regulation of signature gatherers and additional guidelines for peti-
tion forms are options for controlling fraud in signature gathering. A
bill filed in the House of Representatives during the 1995 session
would have required paid signature gatherers to register with the state
and pay a $20 registration fee.3"3 The 1996 Legislature may reconsider
this proposal.
b. Verification of Signatures
The supervisors of elections advise that it is very difficult to verify a
signature when there is more than one voter with the same name in a
single county.31 4 Therefore, they argue that some additional identify-
ing information on the form, such as the date of birth, would be ex-
tremely helpful.3" In addition, requiring the voter identification
number on the petition would streamline the verification process con-
siderably, saving time and money. However, this might make signa-
ture gathering more difficult because it would necessitate that voters
have their registration cards with them if they wished to sign a peti-
tion. Legislation filed during the 1995 Regular Session would have
amended the Florida Statutes to require that signatures be in a specific
format.31 6 The legislation did not pass.
The Legislature has attempted to make changes to the initiative sig-
nature process. In 1990, the Legislature enacted Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 870; however, the Governor vetoed the bill.3 7 This bill
would have required signatures on initiative petitions to be witnessed
and the sponsor to certify that no per signature fee was paid. 8 It also
would have revised the time period for signature validation. 1 9
Governor Bob Martinez stated in his veto message that this bill would
312. See LIMIT v. Maleng, 874 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding invalid a state
law prohibiting payment to signature gatherers on a per-signature basis).
313. Fla. CS for HB 1237 (1995); Fla. CS for HB 2063 (1995); see also FLA. H. Com. ON
ETHICS AND ELECT., FLORIDA'S CITIZEN INrriATv PROCESS (1994) (on file with comm.).
314. CrrtzEN INrriATrvE, supra note 3, at 33.
315. Id.
316. Fla. CS for SB 1392 (1995); Fla. CS for HB 1237 (1994).
317. Veto of Fla. SB 870 (1990) (letter from Gov. Martinez to Sec'y of State Jim Smith, July
2, 1990) (on file with the Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
318. Fla. CS for SB 870 (1990).
319. Id.
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add substantial burdens to the certification procedure.12 0 According to
Governor Martinez,
The amendments to § 100.371, F.S., proposed by the bill so
stringently limit access to certification of a citizens initiative that it
must be viewed as an effort to quash or severely limit the ability of
the people to revise their constitution, in contradiction to the spirit
expressed by this reservation of power.32'
In 1991, the Legislature enacted House Bill 1809, but Governor
Lawton Chiles vetoed this measure as well.322 This bill also would have
required the sponsor of an initiative petition to certify that it had not
paid a per signature fee for the collection of initiative petition signa-
tures.323 The Governor noted in his veto message that he objected to
the additional burden this bill would place on a person wishing to pro-
pose a constitutional amendment to the citizens of this state.3 24 In a
statement similar to that of Governor Martinez, Governor Chiles
noted that he was unaware of any abuse of the current initiative peti-
tion procedure that would warrant more stringent regulation.325 How-
ever, the fraud convictions of signature gatherers in Leon County, as
well as the numerous reports of abuse prior to the 1994 election, dem-
onstrate that abuses of the process do occur.
c. Signature Verification Fees
The Florida Statutes require initiative committees to pay the super-
visor of elections ten cents per name submitted to cover the cost of
verification.3 26 However, in the event a committee is unable to pay for
verification, the committee may file "undue burden" documentation
requesting a waiver of this cost. 2 7 The supervisor of elections may
request reimbursement from the Division of Elections when a commit-
tee files an undue burden form.328 Many supervisors of elections re-
port that the ten cents verification fee is insufficient.3 29
320. Id.
321. Veto of Fla. SB 870 (1990) (letter from Gov. Martinez to Sec'y of State Jim Smith, July
2, 1990) (on file with the Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
322. Veto of Fla. HB 1809 (1991) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec'y of State Jim Smith, May
29, 1991) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
323. Fla. HB 1809 (1991).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. FLA. STAT. § 99.097(4) (1995).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. CITIZEN INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 65.
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Some supervisors of elections maintain that if an initiative commit-
tee pays for signatures, the committee should also pay the signature
verification fee.330 Prior to 1984, the undue burden provisions applied
only to petitions qualifying candidates for public office and not to
initiative petitions.33' However, in Clean-Up '84 v. Heinrich,332 a fed-
eral district court found section 99.097(4), Florida Statutes, to be a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that not al-
lowing the initiative committees to file undue burden documents made
access to the ballot dependent on the wealth of the committee."3
Keeping in mind that the United States Supreme Court has held that
precluding payment to signature gatherers is a violation of the First
Amendment,33 4 it is plausible to assume that requiring payment for
verification is too restrictive on the initiative process and may be un-
constitutional as well.
d. Petition Deadlines
The supervisors of elections overwhelmingly agree that their biggest
problem is the deadline for filing petitions in their offices." 5 The Flor-
ida Constitution and the Florida Statutes address the petition submis-
sion deadline.3 6 A committee must submit its proposed initiative to
the electorate at a general election that is more than ninety days after
the committee has filed the initiative with the secretary of state.33 7 In
addition, section 100.371, Florida Statutes, provides that initiatives
will appear on the ballot for a general election that must occur more
than ninety days after the secretary of state certifies the petition.33
In 1980, the administrative rules required sponsors to submit peti-
tions 122 days prior to the general election in which the constitutional
amendment would appear on the ballot.33 9 A political committee,
330. Fla. State Assoc. of Supervisors of Elections, Inc., Legislative Agenda 1994-95 (1995)
(recommending revision to laws to prohibit petition committees from filing an undue burden
oath if they pay to get petitions signed) (on file with Fla. S. Comm. on Gov't Reform & Over-
sight, Tallahassee, Fla.).
331. FLA. STAT. § 99.097 (1995).
332. 582 F. Supp. 125 (M.D. Fla. 1984), affd, 759F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985).
333. Id.
334. Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 (1988).
335. CrrzNa INITIATrVE, supra note 3, at 65.
336. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5; FLA. STAT. § 100.371(1) (1995).
337. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
338. FLA. STAT. § 100.371 (1995).
339. FLA. A-DwM. CODE AN. r. IC-7.0091 (1995). Rule IC-7.0091 provides that the supervi-
sors of elections must submit verified signatures to the Division of Elections no later than 5 p.m.
of the 91st day preceding the general election. Id. Any certificate received late will not be eligible
to fulfill the required number of signatures for any district or the state as a whole. Id.
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called Citizens Proposition for Tax Relief, attempted to submit
signatures closer than 122 days prior to the next general election.34
The Division of Elections advised that it would not accept the signa-
tures, and the committee challenged the rule in the Florida Supreme
Court .34
The Florida Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the rule re-
quiring submission of signatures 122 days prior to the next general
election.3 42 The court found that the Legislature could construe and
interpret "filing," as used in the constitution, to require, as a prereq-
uisite to acceptance for filing, the verification of the electors' signa-
tures to ensure ballot integrity. 43 However, the court found that the
secretary of state does not have statutory authority to require commit-
tees to file initiative petitions 122 days before the next general elec-
tion.'" The court held that there was no constitutional or statutory
authority for the 122-day limitation.3 45
Arguably, the Legislature could set a deadline for submission of pe-
titions to the supervisors of elections at a reasonable time prior to the
ninety-day deadline before which the supervisors of elections must
certify valid signatures to the Division of Elections. Legislation was
filed during the 1995 Regular Session in both the Florida House of
Representatives and in the Senate to require sponsors to submit their
petitions 151 and 120 days, respectively, prior to the election.)4 The
legislation did not pass.
Ballot integrity and the initiative process would improve if the peti-
tion deadline were moved to a time prior to the filing deadline. This
would provide the supervisors of elections adequate time to verify the
petition signatures. From 120 to 151 days, as previously proposed leg-
islation suggested, seems reasonable.
3. Judicial Review
The supreme court reviews constitutional initiatives to ensure com-
pliance with "single-subject" provisions and to ensure that ballot
titles and summaries are not misleading. 47 The current system of
340. Citizens Proposition for Tax Relief v. Firestone, 386 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1980).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Fla. CS for SB 1392 (1995); Fla. CS for HB 1237 (1995).
347. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3; FLA. STAT. §§ 16.061, 101.161
(1995).
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judicial review of initiatives is a concern to many.34 There is criticism
that the court's rulings on initiatives have "smacked of a paternalistic
attitude that says a proposal is good for the people or bad for the
people. 3 49 One scholar believes the court has concerned itself more
with the "nature of the amendments than with the legal nature of the
[one-subject or ballot language] tests."35 0 Initiative committees com-
plain that the court is inconsistent and has not established guidelines
on which drafters can rely.a51 One initiative committee president be-
lieves that the court should review initiatives only after voters adopt
them . 5 2 On the other hand, some believe that judicial review should
be expanded to include ruling on the constitutionality of a proposed
amendment. 313 Some of the supreme court justices also have acknowl-
edged problems in the current system of judicial review. 5 4
The supreme court denied ballot position to six of the ten initiative
proposals it reviewed prior to the 1994 general election. The court re-
jected two of these for failing to meet the single-subject test,3 " an-
other on the basis of a misleading ballot title and summary,3 6 and the
remaining three for failing to satisfy the single-subject and misleading
language criteria. 57
In Florida, sponsors of an initiative may request that the secretary
of state submit the initiative for judicial review after collecting ten
percent of the necessary signatures. 5 Most committees have taken ad-
vantage of this option.3 59 Others, however, collect all the requisite sig-
natures before judicial review.36
348. CrrzEN INATrvE, supra note 3, at 35-52.
349. Id. at 40 (quoting John T. Ware, former state senator and member of 1968 Constitution
Revision Commission).
350. Id. at 42 (quoting Professor Joseph W. Little, University of Florida College of Law).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 49 (quoting David Biddulph, Chairman, Tax Cap Committee).
353. Id. at 37 (quoting Chesterfield Smith, Holland & Knight; former President, A.B.A.;
Chairman, 1968 Constitution Revision Commission), 48 (quoting Michael Levine of Proposition
for County Choice Gaming, Inc.).
354. Id.
355. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Tax Limitations, 694 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1994).
356. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Limited Casinos, 656 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1994).
357. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Property Rights, 644 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1994); Advi-
sory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Save Our Everglades Trust Fund, 636 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1994);
Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018
(Fla. 1994).
358. FLA. STAT. § 15.21(3) (1995).
359. See e.g. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Casino Authorization, Taxation, and Regu-
lation, 656 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. 1995). This initiative was submitted to the court prior to collec-
tion of all required signatures; however, the court denied the ballot position to the petition
because the title and summary were misleading. Id.
360. C=ZaN InrrtxTwE, supra note 3, at 60.
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The constitution could be amended to provide that the court, in its
advisory opinion, decide whether an initiative is more appropriate as
statutory law than as a constitutional amendment . 61 This role for the
court is advocated by some who recommend the development of a
statutory initiative process. 62 Under this scenario, the court would as-
sist in determining which initiatives would have to be constitutional
amendments and which could be statutory material. Alternatively, re-
visions could limit the court's role to advising on an initiative only
when an adopted initiative is challenged.3 63
An argument can be made that the constitutional initiative process
should be revised to eliminate or reduce the number of initiatives
being denied ballot position because of misleading language in the bal-
lot title or summary.31 The Oregon process could be a model.3 6 Un-
der that process, the Oregon Attorney General drafts ballot titles and
summaries, and the Oregon Supreme Court determines whether the
language is insufficient or unfair and it has authority to rewrite and
correct any misleading language.' 6 With this authority, the Florida
Supreme Court would not need to remove proposals from the ballot,
but could correct a misleading title and summary. 367
Some states provide assistance in drafting initiative language by the
state's legislative staff or other state officials.161 As Florida does, most
states with initiative processes permit pre-election judicial review for
procedural compliance;3 69 however, few states allow early court inter-
vention on the grounds of proper subject matter. 370 As in Florida,
other states' courts generally refrain from pre-election reviews of ini-
tiatives on constitutional grounds and prefer to wait for a court chal-
lenge after a measure is adopted.3 7' The same, however, is true of
statutory laws. Statutes may be on the books for many years before
being challenged in the courts.
361. Id. at 61.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Tax Limitations, 694 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1994).
365. CITMN INIATwE, supra note 3, at 61 (quoting Overton, J.).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 360. Alternatives for drafting ballot titles and summaries include having the sec-
retary of state, the attorney general, or legislative bill drafting services assist in drafting initia-
tives. More expertise in drafting ballot titles and summaries would prevent misleading language.
However, it can be argued that a true citizen initiative should be drafted by the sponsor.
369. Id. at 362. Most states with constitutional or statutory initiative processes impose a
single-subject rule on the content of the proposals. Id. Most also have procedures for ballot title
and summary review. Id. at 361.
370. Id. at 363.
371. Id.
19951
456 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:417
One scholar has suggested that the court has gone beyond its consti-
tutional charge by keeping off the ballot amendments that the court
perceives as undesirable public policy. 7 2 Similarly, another commen-
tator has criticized some of the court's perceived "inconsistencies.'
In contrast, others believe that the court is in an untenable dilemma: it
"get[s] thrown right into the forefront of every hot political issue
.... [and] [tihose are decisions made at tremendous political cost.
The court is seen to be standing in the way of a stampede. Those who
want to stampede keep blaming the court for a restraint of popular
will." 3 74 Despite the concerns of some, others believe that the judicial
process is functioning well and provides desirable checks and balances
on the initiative process . 75 As initiatives are increasingly proposed,
the controversy regarding the supreme court and its decisions regard-
ing initiatives will continue. The judicial review process is an area
which defies easy resolution.
4. Public Awareness of the Effects of Initiatives
Direct initiative processes may not provide the degree of debate and
analysis desirable for determining public policy issues. 716 For example,
Florida's direct constitutional initiative process requires only that ini-
tiative sponsors publish their balloted proposal twice prior to the elec-
tion in one newspaper of general circulation in each county.3 77 In
addition, once the secretary of state has approved a proposal's ballot
title and summary, a sponsor cannot modify the' proposal.
Consequently, a sponsor has no opportunity to refine an initiative in
response to concerns raised during the publication phase. The elector-
ate may adopt constitutional amendments without adequate explana-
tion of their impact and thus cause unanticipated consequences.
Alternatively, the legislative process maximizes public awareness
and deliberation. When the Florida Legislature is considering enacting
a law, various committee staff members analyze the bill, including the
bill's fiscal impact.3 7 Legislative meetings are open to the public and
provide a forum for debate. 379 Frequently, this process results in revi-
sions and modifications to proposed measures and raises public
awareness of particular issues.
372. Id. at 41 (quoting Professor Thomas C. Marks, Stetson College of Law).
373. Id. at 62.
374. Id. (quoting Talbot D'Alemberte).
375. Cr1zaN INITTrvE, supra note 3, at 35-52.
376. Id. at 40-41.
377. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
378. CnTIzs INITIAT VE, supra note 3, at 67.
379. Id.
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The source of public information about initiatives is frequently paid
advertising. This method can result in highly financed, one-sided ar-
guments for or against proposals.3 8° To provide more balanced de-
bate, lawmakers could require that initiative sponsors conduct public
hearings on a proposal's merits. 8 ' Alternatively, lawmakers could re-
quire government-sponsored hearings around the state on each
amendment placed on the ballot. 8
Fourteen states require the distribution of a ballot pamphlet con-
taining an unbiased description and analysis of ballot measures. 3
Some states require sponsors to publish only a fiscal impact state-
ment. Florida lawmakers could require petition organizers to provide
voters with what one commentator calls an "impact statement. '38
This impact statement would summarize not only the estimated costs
of the amendment but also other effects on laws, taxes, spending, and
public policies.3"5 An unbiased governmental entity might better per-
form this function. One observer recommends that the secretary of
state publish, for the citizens' edification, a pamphlet explaining all
ballot issues in "plain talk." 38 6
Adding requirements for hearings and impact statements would re-
sult in higher costs for either the initiative sponsor or the state entities.
Higher costs for initiative sponsors is a double-edged sword-special
interest groups might easily raise funds, while a true grassroots
sponsor might find increased costs restrictive.38 7 Consequently, it is
likely that the taxpayer would pay increased costs associated with ini-
tiatives.3 8 However, an indirect initiative process could alleviate the
costs of these requirements. Proposals would go through the estab-
lished legislative process and be exposed to strict review by legislators,
committee staff, and the public. 8 9
380. DEMOCRACY By INrriATrE, supra note 159, at 21.
381. Id. at 21 (recommending public hearings once the committee has gathered 25% of the
required signatures).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 67.
384. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Tom Sander, Editor, Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 68. "Plain talk" would be clear language which the average citizen could under-
stand. Id.
387. Id. at 47-49. Former state Senator Marlene Woodson-Howard responded in the com-
mittee's survey that the initiative process "has become something which can be bought by special
interests." Id. at 47. David Biddulph, Chairman, Tax Cap Committee, responded that the proc-
ess "is too uncertain, difficult, and expensive" for the average citizen to use. Id. at 49.
388. Id. at 68. Tom Sander stated that, for the 1992 election, California's secretary of state
published a plain-talk pamphlet explaining 13 amendments that cost $4.32 million. Id.
389. Id. at 41. Professor Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Stetson University College of Law, stated
"many proposed changes can appear reasonable on their face when a little thought would show
that if they are placed on the ballot and ratified, they could wreak havoc on the ability of gov-
ernment to carry out its functions." Id.
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VIII. ESTABLISHING A STATUTORY INITIATIVE PROCESS
Florida's current constitutional initiative process allows constitu-
tional amendments that would often be more appropriate for statu-
tory law. 319 For example, Justice Parker Lee McDonald thought that
the net fishing amendment, adopted in 1994, illustrated this point.39'
Because the citizens of Florida have only one avenue to exercise "di-
rect democracy"-amendment to the constitution-the lack of a stat-
utory initiative option encourages constitutional changes which would
be more appropriate as statutory measures.
Arguably, the constitution should be a broad framework outlining
the composition, duties, and powers of governmental bodies, and it
should be limited to the fundamental issues of governance. 92 There-
fore, processes of amendment and revision should be limited.393 When
the Legislature passes a law that is later found to have errors or unin-
tended consequences, it can amend the law during the next legislative
session. Constitutional amendments, by contrast, become fairly rigid
and difficult to change even if a mistake is made. The same initiative
processes that created an errant initiative provision must be used to
correct the mistake.
Florida should institute a statutory initiative. 94 Such a method
would provide citizens with an additional avenue of direct democracy
and protect the constitution from amendments that would be more
appropriate as statutes.3 95 Florida is one of only three states that pro-
vide a constitutional initiative process without also providing a statu-
tory initiative process. 39 The other two states in this category, Illinois
and Mississippi, have more restrictive initiative processes than Flor-
ida. While, to date, few citizen initiatives have made it to the Florida
ballots and fewer have amended the constitution, recent history indi-
cates that the number of initiative petitions will increase.3 A statu-
tory process would decrease the number of attempted constitutional
390. See Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997,
1000 (Fla. 1993) (McDonald, J., concurring).
391. Id.
392. CITIZEN Isiwr , ivE, supra note 3, at 54.
393. Id. at 41 (quoting Professor Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Stetson University College of Law).
394. Id. at 35-52. Survey respondents who concur with considering the development or im-
plementation of a statutory initiative include constitutional scholars, former members of the
constitution revision commissions, attorneys representing parties to the recent court hearings on
initiatives, and some representatives of citizen initiative committees. Id.
395. FLA. H. COMM. ON ETICS AND ELECTIONS, FLORIDA'S CITIZEN INITIATIVE PROCESS 22
(1994).
396. Cor cL OF STATE Gov'TS, supra note 151, at 296.
397. See discussion supra part V.D.
CITIZEN INITIATIVE IN FLORIDA
amendments. However, Florida must address concerns about the type
of statutory initiative process to adopt and the procedures for the new
process.
In developing a statutory initiative process, several issues need to be
considered. These issues include the direct or indirect nature of the
process should be indirect or direct; the role of the judiciary, secretary
of state, and attorney general in reviewing initiatives; and the proce-
dures for amending initiatives.3 9 Further, the same issues currently
identified with Florida's constitutional initiative process would apply
to a statutory process. Those concerns include ballot title and sum-
mary drafting, judicial review procedures, public education methods,
and the signature-gathering process.199
An indirect statutory initiative method could alleviate many of these
concerns. For example, if the Legislature identifies problems in an ini-
tiative, it could propose alternative ballot title and summary language
to be coupled with a statutory amendment on the ballot. The legisla-
tive process would provide increased opportunities for issue analysis
and public comment on initiatives and decrease the need for addi-
tional funding.
Another significant consideration is the number of signatures re-
quired for passage of a statutory initiative. Most states with a consti-
tutional initiative and a statutory initiative process require fewer
signatures for a statutory initiative. The reasons for this are that a
statutory initiative is easier to revise and a lower signature
requirement is an incentive for sponsors to seek statutory change
rather than constitutional amendment. In some states, however, if the
legislature does not adopt a statutory initiative, a sponsor must gather
additional signatures to place its initiative on the ballot. 4°' Although
the number of signatures for a statutory initiative should be lower
than for a constitutional initiative, it is not in Florida's best interest to
make the signature requirement so low as to invite an onslaught of
initiatives. This could adversely affect Florida's representative form of
government and potentially confuse voters with long and complex bal-
lots.
After consideration of these issues, institution of a statutory initia-
tive process would require a constitutional amendment. This could be
accomplished by the Florida Legislature's filing a joint resolution dur-
ing the 1996 session to place a constitutional amendment on the 1996
398. CrrzEN IrmATrvE, supra note 3, at 73.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
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ballot.40 2 Alternatively, the Constitution Revision Commission sched-
uled to meet in 1998 could address the initiative process along with
other constitutional revisions. 403 This would forestall adoption of a
new process until elections in 1998 but would allow more delibera-
tion.1
IX. CONCLUSION
Since 1968, Florida has provided its citizens a method of amending
the constitution by citizen initiative. However, with respect to our cur-
rent constitutional initiative process, observers have identified several
areas of concern that merit further review. Notwithstanding those is-
sues, the interest in and use of initiatives is on the rise and there is no
indication of public sentiment to deny citizens the right to propose
initiatives. It is unlikely that the electorate would adopt an amend-
ment to repeal Florida's method of direct democracy. It seems more
practical to consider improvement of, or an alternative to, the current
method of initiatives.
The prospect of numerous and continual amendments threatens the
sanctity of the constitution. Florida should establish a statutory initia-
tive process to preserve the integrity of the constitution and provide
citizens another opportunity to affect policy directly. Further, the de-
velopment of a statutory initiative process would protect the constitu-
tion from provisions more appropriate as statutory law. To increase
public participation and encourage public comment and debate on ini-
tiatives, an indirect statutory initiative process is the best alternative.
In tandem with instituting a statutory initiative process, Florida
should make it more difficult to amend the constitution by initiative.
Factors to be considered in limiting constitutional initiative amend-
ments include increasing the number of petition signatures, requiring
a super-majority vote to enact an amendment, and restricting the sub-
ject matter of initiatives. Citizens would be more likely to accept limi-
tations on constitutional initiatives if they were provided an avenue of
direct democracy through access to statutory initiatives.
Whether the Legislature addresses the development of a statutory
initiative process directly or leaves the matter to the Constitution Re-
vision Commission, there should be thorough deliberation and
evaluation of alternatives and all procedural aspects of the initiative
process. Prior to proposing an amendment to the electorate, either the
402. Id. at 73.
403. See Maher, supra note 63, at 67.
404. Id.
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Legislature or the Commission should solicit the advice of experts and
conduct public hearings on developing a new process.

